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Over the past decade, failures of federally insured depository institu-
tions have increased to a crisis point.1 Embezzlement, excessive compen-
sation, improper lending practices, and other types of insider abuse and
fraud by directors, officers, and various third parties have been present in
a staggering number of these failures. 2 The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) has been active in litigating civil claims against such
directors and officers to recoup the billions of dollars in government
funds lost in reimbursing depositors and other creditors of the failed in-
stitutions. 3 To this end, the FDIC has urged that it should have priority
* The author thanks Ira Paul and Lawrence Baxter for their assistance.
1. The failure of 79 banks in 1984 established a post-Depression record, only to be exceeded
by 120 in 1985, 138 in 1986, 184 in 1987, 200 in 1988, and 206 in 1989-the highest number since
the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 101 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 FDIC REPORT] (Table 122).
In 1990, 168 banks failed. FDIC Reports Decline in Bank Failures; Pays Off Insured Deposits at
Mass. Bank, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 13 (Jan. 7, 1991).
2. Estimates of the amount of fraud in the banking industry vary. The Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (OCC), the Department of Justice, the Government Accounting Office (GAO),
and the FDIC each conduct regular studies of the causes of bank failures. The OCC's study cited
insider abuse as a significant factor in 35%, and material fraud in 11%, of the bank failures studied.
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE
FAcToRs CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKs 9 (1988). The FDIC reported in
its latest annual report that about one-quaiter of all banks that failed in 1989 experienced some form
of insider abuse or criminal fraud. See 1989 FDIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. For a discussion of
the studies conducted by the GAO and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), see infra notes 39-
41 and accompanying text. For a description of the major frauds and insider abuses in financial
institutions, see Fraud in America's Insured Depository Institutions" Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing; and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 60, 61-64 (1990) [hereinafter
Bank Fraud Hearings] (statement of Benton E. Gup, Chair of Banking, University of Alabama).
3. Whenever a financial institution fails, the FDIC conducts an investigation of officers, direc-
tors, and attorneys, and evaluates the need for legal action. As of April 1990, the FDIC had approx-
imately 1300 open investigations and 350 suits pending. Officers and Directors Are Targets for FDIC
Suits, FDIC Associate Counsel Warns, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 690 (Apr. 26, 1990).
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over all other claimants in collecting damages against directors and of-
ficers, regardless of whether other claimants received judgments before
the FDIC.4 This Note argues that neither federal common law nor stat-
ute authorizes such a priority.
The FDIC's role as insurer of failed national and state depository
institutions permeates the day-to-day operation of these institutions even
before a state or federal regulator declares them insolvent. The FDIC
regulates these institutions through its powers to examine records, to re-
quire various financial and accounting reports of institutions, and to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations that maintain stability in the banking
industry.5 The FDIC also possesses the power to become the receiver of
any insured institutions that fail.6 In accordance with its congressional
mandate, the FDIC manages each failed or failing federally insured insti-
tution (whether chartered by a state or the federal government) in prepa-
ration for either liquidation or sale to a solvent institution.7 The FDIC
also investigates the cause of each institution's failure.
The issue of an FDIC priority over shareholders arises when the
FDIC's investigation of a depository institution's failure indicates that
mismanagement or fraud affected the stability of the institution and there
are pending shareholder suits against the perpetrators of that misman-
agement or fraud. The FDIC has an interest both as an insurer and as a
representative of depositors in controlling the level of safety and sound-
ness in each insured institution's banking practices. If a failed institution
has experienced mismanagement or fraud, the FDIC, on behalf of either
itself as insurer or the institution's depositors, may initiate a suit against
the alleged wrongdoers to recover damages." Defendants in this suit may
also have a fiduciary duty to protect the equity interests of institution
shareholders; mismanagement or fraud on the part of an institution's of-
ficers or directors constitutes a breach of this duty. Thus, shareholdeis
of the failed institution may pursue the same defendants in private indi-
vidual or class actions.9 In many cases, a single judgment for misman-
agement of a financial institution is sufficient to deplete entirely the
4. See Bank Fraud Hearings, supra note 2, at 134, 144-45 (1990) (FDIC and RTC Comments
on S. 1970).
5. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE COR-
PORATION: THE FIRST FIFrY YEARS 116-27 (1984) [hereinafter THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS] (avail-
able from the FDIC).
6. See id. at 83-87.
7. In a limited number of situations in which an institution is insolvent and is a vital part of a
community, the FDIC will "bail out" the institution to preserve banking in that community. See
infra note 36 and accompanying text.
8. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d), (g) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
9. See, eg., Howard v. Haddad, 916 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1990). But see Popkin v. Jacoby (In re
Sunrise Sec. Litig.), 916 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990) (claims against former officers and directors of a
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wrongdoing official's assets or liability insurance fund. In such cases, a
conflict arises at the time of judgment collection between the FDIC,
which seeks assets to pay off depositors or to replenish its insurance fund,
and the shareholders, who seek compensation for their investment loss.
Both parties look to the same assets for compensation.
One circuit court has created a federal common law rule of priority
for the FDIC over depository institution shareholders in collecting judg-
ments against defendants whose assets are insufficient to satisfy both the
FDIC and shareholders.10 Upon the FDIC's initiation of suit against
officers and directors of a failed financial institution, this rule of priority
directs a court to stay collection of all damages awarded shareholders
until the completion of the FDIC's case and its collection of any awarded
damages."
Whether the FDIC should have such a priority is an important yet
unresolved question that carries significant implications for shareholders'
rights. At present, three federal circuits have addressed the issue of
FDIC priority over shareholders in fraud, mismanagement, and other
claims against bank officers and directors.12 These three decisions have
adopted conflicting positions on the need for a general common law rule
of FDIC priority. In Gaff v. FDIC,'3 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the FDIC has priority over stockholders in claims
against a bank's former officers and directors. 14 By contrast, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in FDIC v. Jenkins1 5 reached the oppo-
site result and denied the FDIC priority.16 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit explicitly followed Jenkins in Howard v. Haddad,17 and
denied the FDIC priority over damage awards.' 8
Despite the inconsistent holdings of Gaff and Jenkins, both the
Sixth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit based their analyses on the
failed savings and loan association were derivative in nature and therefore could not be brought
directly as a class action).
10. See Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990), modified on reh'g, 933 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.
1991).
11. See id at 397; see also FDIC v. American Bank Trust Shares, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 302
(D.S.C. 1976) (staying a shareholder suit against bank officers and directors pending outcome of
FDIC litigation against same defendants), vacated, 558 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1977).
12. See Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990); Howard v. Haddad, 916 F.2d 167 (4th Cir.
1990); FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537 (1lth Cir. 1989).
13. 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990).
14. See id. at 396.
15. 888 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
16. See id. at 1546.
17. 916 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1990). Because the Fourth Circuit explicitly adopted the holding in
Jenkins, and did not contribute any additional analysis on the issue of an FDIC priority, this Note
will not address Haddad in any detail.
18. See id. at 170.
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Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,19
which set forth the appropriate test for determining whether a federal
program requires a priority over private interests to achieve Congress's
goals in creating the program. In Kimbell Foods, the Court applied a
two-part analysis to deny the Small Business Administration (SBA) and
Farmers Home Administration (FHA) a federal common law priority
over competing lienholders in collecting payment on government loans.20
The Court found that state law, as opposed to a uniform federal law,
governed the priority of liens created by the SBA and FHA loans.21 The
Court held that federal courts may create a uniform rule of priority for a
federal program only if (1) federal law applies to the program, and (2) a
uniform law is necessary to achieve the federal program's goals. 22 To
determine the second part of this analysis, the Court created a three-
factor test that balances the extent to which uniformity is necessary to
achieve the program's goals, the effect state laws would have on the pro-
gram, and the impact a uniform rule would have on state commercial
practices. 23
This Note analyzes the need for a uniform rule of FDIC priority
over shareholders in bank-related litigation in light of the analysis set
forth in Kimbell Foods. The Note concludes that a uniform rule of prior-
ity for the FDIC in judgment and settlement collections is not essential
to the FDIC's achievement of stability in the banking industry, and
therefore the FDIC should not receive absolute priority over claims of
depository institution shareholders.
To place the current circuit conflict in context, Part I provides an
overview of the existing climate of depository institution failures and
FDIC management of this crisis. Part II describes the facts and reason-
ing of the two circuit cases that have addressed the issue of an FDIC
priority, Jenkins and Gaff, and argues that neither case has applied prop-
erly the Kimbell Foods balancing test. Part III analyzes a rule of priority
for the FDIC in judgment collections against bank-related defendants in
light of the requirements for federal common law priority rules set out in
Kimbell Foods, concluding that current federal common law jurispru-
dence does not mandate FDIC priority. Part IV explores the legislative
history of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA), an omnibus financial institution reform, for the
19. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
20. See id at 718.
21. See id at 729.
22. See id. at 726-33.
23. See id. at 728-29.
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possibility of an implicit provision for FDIC priority over depository in-
stitution shareholders in judgment collection. This part concludes that
there is no authority for an FDIC priority under the current statutory
framework. Part V discusses the legislative history of an explicit FDIC
priority of claims provision in various bills introduced in Congress since
the omnibus reform, including the current Senate reform bill. Part VI
concludes that the achievement of an FDIC priority over shareholders
through development of federal common law is not only unnecessary, but
would be detrimental to the depository institution industry.
I. THE FDIC's ROLE IN THE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTION INDUSTRY
Congress created the FDIC in the Banking Act of 193324 in re-
sponse to the failure of more than 9000 commercial banks between 1930
and 193325 and the bank runs caused by these failures. Congress envi-
sioned the federal deposit insurance system as a primary vehicle to pro-
mote stability in a depressed banking industry and to protect banks from
the risk of "bank runs."'26 Federal deposit insurance reassures depositors
of the safety of deposited funds by guaranteeing payment on all accounts
containing $100,000 or less, and thus decreases depositors' incentives to
withdraw funds before a rumored bank closure.
By almost any measure, federal deposit insurance successfully stabi-
lized the U.S. banking system after the crisis of the early 1930s. 27 Yet
24. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168-80 (amended 1935). The
Banking Act of 1933 introduced a temporary plan of federal deposit insurance. This legislation was
followed two years later by the comprehensive Banking Act of 1935, which permanently established
the FDIC and granted it supervisory authority over all insured banks that were not supervised by a
federal agency. See Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 684-703. In 1950,
this section was withdrawn from the Federal Reserve Act and made a separate act. See Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, § 1, 64 Stat. 873, 873 (1950) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. I 1989)). A federal district court summarized the national economic environ-
ment surrounding the creation of the FDIC:
The FDIC is a corporation originally established during the economic and banking crisis of
the early 1930s when thousands of banks were forced to close their doors. It was created to
restore and reinforce public confidence in the banking system, to promote safe and sound
banking practices and the stability of banks, to obviate runs on banks by depositors, to
safeguard deposits through deposit insurance, and to prevent the recurrence of the events
of 1931 and 1932 which sapped banking strength and climaxed in the "bank holiday" of
March, 1933.
FDIC v. Allen, 584 F. Supp. 386, 397 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (citations omitted).
25. KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COM-
PETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 150-51 (1984).
26. See THE FIRsT FIFrY YEARS, supra note 5, at 4. A bank run occurs most often when
negative reports about a bank's solvency induce depositors to withdraw their funds from the alleg-
edly ailing institution. For a description of a typical bank run, see GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL.,
PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE & SOUND BANKING 65-66 (1986).
27. See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 25, at 161 ("An average of only 48 banks per year failed
in the first five years after establishment of the FDIC (1934-1939).").
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after half a century of relative calm, the sudden emergence of a savings
and loan crisis and the bailouts of a number of large banks now present
the FDIC with the possibility of a significant drain on its insurance
funds.2 8 To best preserve its insurance funds, the FDIC must manage
individual bank failures quickly and effectively and recapitalize its funds
with all available assets, including proceeds from litigation. Speed is a
crucial facfor in maintaining stability in the face of an institution's eco-
nomic failure; if the FDIC can successfully assume the operation of a
failing institution, or quickly transfer operation to a solvent bank, then
depositors will not experience an interruption of service, which is a sig-
nificant cause of loss of consumer confidence and bank runs.
A. FDIC Management of a Bank Failure
When an insured depository institution fails, the FDIC will gener-
ally be appointed as its receiver.2 9 Whether a failing institution is feder-
ally or state chartered determines the method by which the FDIC
becomes the receiver. Federal banks may have the FDIC appointed as a
receiver if one of eight enumerated conditions exists.30 A state bank, on
the other hand, may be seized by either of two methods. Under the first
28. The Bank Insurance Fund, which insures all approved national and state banks, was estab-
lished by 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a)(5) (West 1989); the Savings Association Insurance Fund, which
insures qualifying savings and loan associations, was established by 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a)(6) (West
1989). The FDIC manages both funds. Before 1989, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration'(FSLIC) insured deposits in savings and loan institutions. On August 8, 1989, all FSLIC
assets were transferred to the FSLIC Resolution Fund pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821a (a)(2) (West
1989).
In addition to reimbursements that the FDIC procures from litigation after assisting a bank, the
funds derive their revenues from regulatory depository institution assessments (based on a percent-
age of total assets) and interest earned on investment of the assessments in U.S. Treasury obligations.
See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 208, 103 Stat. 183, 206-16 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1817 (West Supp. 1991)).
29. See THE FiRST FiFry YEARS, supra note 5, at 83.
30. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 203(a) (West Supp. 1991). The Comptroller of the Currency may ap-
point the FDIC as conservator of a bank whenever the Comptroller determines that one or more of
the following circumstances exist:
(1) any one or more of the conditions for appointment of a receiver for the bank
specified in section 191 of [the Bank Conservation Act] are present;
(2) the bank is not likely to be able to meet the demands of its depositors or pay its
obligations in the normal course of business;
(3) the bank is in an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business, including hav-
ing substantially insufficient capital or otherwise;
(4)(A) the bank has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will delete all or substan-
tially all of its capital, and
(B) there is no reasonable prospect for the bank's capital to be replenished without
Federal assistance;
(5) there is a violation or violations of laws, rules, or regulations, or any unsafe or
unsound practice or condition which is likely to cause insolvency or substantial dissipation
of assets or earnings, or is likely to weaken the bank's condition or otherwise seriously
prejudice the interests of its depositors;
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method, the FDIC may accept an appointment as receiver of an insured
state institution after the institution has been seized by a state banking
agency.31 Under the second method, the FDIC may appoint itself as
receiver of an insured state institution if the state has already put the
institution into receivership. 32
Once the FDIC has become receiver or conservator of a depository
institution, it may protect depositors in three ways.3 3 First, the FDIC
may close and liquidate an institution and pay depositors out of the de-
posit insurance fund the full value of their insured deposits (up to
$100,000 per account).34 Second, the FDIC may assist in the absorption
of the failed institution by another institution in a "purchase and as-
sumption" transaction.35 Third, when the continued existence of a fail-
ing depository institution is essential to its community, the FDIC may
(6) there is concealment of books, papers, records, or assets of the bank, or refusal to
submit books, papers, records, or affairs of the bank for inspection to any examiner or to
any lawful agent of the Comptroller;
(7) there is a willful or continuing violation of an order enforceable against the bank
under section 1818(i) of this title; or
(8) the bank's board of directors consists of fewer than 5 members.
Id
31. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (c)(1), (c)(3) (1989); see, eg., FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537,
1538-39 (11th Cir. 1989) (reporting that the Florida Department of Banking and Finance declared
the federally insured, state chartered Park Bank insolvent and appointed the FDIC as receiver of the
bank).
32. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(1), (c)(4) (1989).
33. See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 25, at 157.
34. The limit of the FDIC's liability per depositor was increased to $100,000 by the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 308(a)(1)(C), 94
Stat. 132, 147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1988)).
35. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2), (c)(4)(A) (1988). In a purchase and assumption transaction,
the FDIC attempts to:
arrange for another bank to "purchase" the failed bank and reopen it without interrupting
banking operations and with no loss to the depositors. A purchase and assumption in-
volves three entities: the receiver of the failed bank, the purchasing bank, and the FDIC as
insurer. In most cases, the FDIC is appointed receiver by the appropriate banking author-
ity and thus acts in two separate capacities: as receiver and as corporate insurer.
As soon as the receiver is appointed, the FDIC solicits bids from other banks for the
purchase of the failed bank and assumption of its liabilities.... After receiving the bids, the
FDIC Board of Directors determines whether the purchase and assumption is feasible ac-
cording to the statutory requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (1 lth Cir.) (citation and footnote omitted), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 826 (1982).
Often it is not possible for the FDIC immediately to arrange for a receiver of the failed institu-
tion. In such a case, the FDIC may use its authority to establish a "bridge bank" to take over and
reorganize temporarily the operations of a failed institution to prepare it for a purchase and assump-
tion transaction. Under 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(n) (West 1989), the FDIC may establish a bridge bank
when an insured bank is closed and more time is needed to find a permanent solution. Although not
subject to any reserve requirements, a bridge bank is a full-service national bank established on an
interim basis to assume the deposits, certain liabilities, and substantially all of the assets of a failed
bank. The bridge bank may be operated for up to five years by a board of directors appointed by the
FDIC. Id. § 1821(n)(9). A bridge bank may be established only if the cost of operating it does not
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provide resources to keep the institution afloat,36 take over the operation
of the institution, and then reorganize it. This is called the "direct pay-
out" method. The FDIC generally favors the purchase and assumption
method over the liquidation and direct payout methods.37
B. Litigation Against Bank Officers and Directors
The FDIC's role as insurer and representative of depositors requires
it to decide whether to bring actions against bank officers or managers for
fraud or mismanagement of an institution. Corporate mismanagement
and fraud contribute to a great number of depository institution fail-
ures.38 In a 1989 study of savings and loan failures, the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) discovered insider abuse and fraud at every one
of the twenty-six failed thrifts studied.3 9 A 1991 study conducted by the
exceed the cost of liquidating the closed bank. The FDIC used bridge banks in the three largest
bank failures in 1989. 1989 FDIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
For more complete descriptions of the FDIC's options in structuring a depository institution
failure, including the purchase and assumption transaction, see John F. Borenzi & Arthur J.
Murton, Resolution Costs of Bank Failures, 1 FDIC BANKING REv. 1, 1-4 (1988); Michael B. Bur-
gee, Purchase and Assumption Transactions Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 14 FORUM
1146, 1154-59 (1979).
From a public policy perspective, the purchase and assumption solution is superior to a liquida-
tion because if a bank is liquidated the community loses the services of the bank, the public loses
confidence in the system, and customers with deposits that exceed the insured amount lose their
uninsured funds. See Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865-66.
Some theorists argue, however, that providing de facto 100% coverage via purchase and as-
sumption transactions only promotes poor management by banks and poor choice of banks by cus-
tomers. Thus, they contend, purchase and assumption transactions have been part of the cause of
the recent rash of bank failures rather than an appropriate response. See, eg., Daniel R. Fischel et
al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301, 313-16 (1987)
(arguing that FDIC use of purchase and assumption transactions and bail outs with de facto 100%
insurance creates moral hazard that banks will fail to internalize the cost of risky activities).
36. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (1988). But see id. § 1823(c)(4) ("No assistance shall be pro-
vided under this subsection in an amount in excess of that amount which the Corporation deter-
mines to be reasonably necessary to save the cost of liquidating.").
37. From 1987 to mid-1991, the FDIC arranged some form of purchase and assumption trans-
action in 91% of its 863 bank interventions. By contrast, it provided direct assistance in five percent
of the cases and liquidated the failed bank in four percent of the cases. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, BANK INSURANCE FUND MID-YEAR RESULTS 8 (1990).
38. See supra note 2; see also 1989 FDIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 39 ("Various courts across
the country during 1989 awarded more that $60 million in restitution payments to the FDIC and the
FSLIC from former officers, directors or borrowers at closed banks and thrifts who were convicted
of embezzlement or other forms of bank fraud.").
39. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFr FAILURES: COSTLY FAIL-
URES RESULTED FROM REGULATORY VIOLATIONS AND UNSAFE PRACTICES 2, 3, 23 (1989). The
GAO review of savings and loan associations covered 26 institutions that the FSLIC either merged,
liquidated, or began assisting between January 1, 1985 and September 30, 1987, or anticipated assist-
ing as of September 30, 1987. These institutions represented over 50% of FSLIC's estimated losses
at the time. Id at 2.
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Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) found that suspected criminal con-
duct was present in fifty-eight percent of the 622 thrift institutions it
held.40 The RTC investigation also discovered that potential insider
criminal conduct contributed to insolvency in thirty-eight percent of the
RTC thrifts. 41
The FDIC possesses no authority to prosecute individuals on crimi-
nal charges; it must instead refer suspected criminal conduct in financial
institutions to the U.S. Department of Justice.42 The FDIC may, how-
ever, file civil suits in its capacity as both receiver in a liquidation and
corporate insurer in a purchase and assumption transaction. FDIC suits
against individuals often assert claims of common law fraud, negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, as well as violations of banking statutes and
civil claims under RICO.43
The FDIC as receiver has a duty to investigate and to pursue all
viable causes of action. Section 11(d) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (FDIA)44 sets forth the FDIC's duty as receiver to collect the assets
of a bank and to enforce the full accountability of its officers and direc-
tors. The receiver may institute any suit (on behalf of the bank), includ-
ing shareholder derivative suits, that the bank itself could have
commenced.45 In a depository institution liquidation, the Professional
Liabilities Section of the FDIC's Litigation Branch helps the FDIC's Di-
vision of Liquidation investigate each institution failure to determine
whether the FDIC as receiver should bring civil claims for monetary
40. See RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATIONS:
PROGRESS TO DATE 12 (1991). As of June 30, 1991, the RTC was managing 212 thrifts and had
resolved 410. Id at 5.
41. Id. at 12.
42. For a general discussion of the criminal laws that the Justice Department uses to prosecute
financial institution officers and directors, see Renae V. Stevens, Note, Insider Abuse and Criminal
Misconduct in Financial Institutions" A Crisis?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 222, 234-41 (1989).
Although the FDIC lacks authority to bring criminal actions, it has a criminal investigations unit
(the "fraud squad") that investigates criminal activity in many open institutions and all closed
banks. The RTC Office of Investigations conducts similar inquiries in all closed thrifts. Bank Fraud
Hearings, supra note 2, at 114-17 (testimony of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC).
43. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988); see Thomas P. Vartanian & Michael D. Schley, Bank Officer and Director Liability-Regula-
tory Actions 39 Bus. LAW 1021, 1023-28 (1984). In addition, the Financial Institution Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 901-920, 951, 103 Stat. 183, 446-88,
498-99 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A.), significantly increased civil mone-
tary penalties and enhanced the enforcement powers of the FDIC-thus heightening the potential
for lawsuits against officers and directors.
44. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d) (West Supp. 1991).
45. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(2)(A) (West 1989); see also Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d
Cir. 1973) (holding that when a corporation is in receivership, shareholders' demand to bring suit on
their behalf must be made on the receiver instead of the directors, and demand will be excused only
if the FDIC was personally involved or interested in the alleged wrongdoing).
Vol. 41:329]
338 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:329
damages against certain individuals. The Professional Liability Section
then supervises the litigation of any claims made.46 In a purchase and
assumption transaction, the FDIC in its capacity as a corporate insurer
acquires the cause of action from the FDIC as receiver. 47
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of whether
the FDIC should have a priority over depository institution shareholders
in litigating or collecting awards against an institution's officers and di-
rectors. Only three circuits have addressed this issue.48 Under current
46. In 1989, the FDIC's professional liability litigation workload tripled to manage the cases
and investigations arising out of 1250 failed depository institutions. 1989 FDIC REPORT, supra note
1, at 39. The litigation section recovered $100 million from failed banks and thrifts during the year,
a 56% increase over $64 million in 1988. lad
47. The FDIC's status as the regulator and insurer of failed institutions permits it to bring civil
suits against officers and directors: "As insurers of financial institutions, the FDIC and FSLIC
regularly become assignees or subrogees of claims of failed institutions in connection with payment
of assistance to a third-party acquirer of the institution." Vartanian & Schley, supra note 43, at
1028; see also FDIC v. Ashley, 585 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that FDIC's status as a pur-
chaser of assets does not change merely because it also acts as seller).
48. See Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990); Howard v. Haddad, 916 F.2d 167 (4th Cir.
1990); FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537 (1lth Cir. 1989). In addition, the Third Circuit has ex-
pressed in dictum what could be considered disapproval of an FDIC priority in Popkin v. Jacoby (In
re Sunrise Sec. Litig.), 916 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990). In that case, depositors' suits against the bank in
receivership conflicted with the FDIC's pursuit against the bank on similar claims in a shareholder
derivative action. Although the Third Circuit granted the FDIC priority, it distinguished the facts
from the Eleventh Circuit case, Jenkins, and claimed that its holding was consistent with Jenkins.
Id. at 889. The court hinted that, in a nonderivative case more factually analogous to Jenkins, it
would deny the FDIC a priority: "To the extent that depositors assert individual, nonderivative
fraud claims against the officers, directors, auditors, or attorneys of insolvent financial institutions,
they may proceed on equal footing with FDIC against these defendants." Id.
Some district courts have also addressed the issue. See In re Atlantic Fin. Sec. Litig., No. 89-
0645, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7439 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1991) (denying the RTC's motion to stay
shareholder proceedings against bank officers and directors pending resolution of the RTC's claims
against the same defendants); see also Crocker v. McMullan, 623 F. Supp. 963 (D. Miss. 1985)
(court denied FDIC motion to stay shareholder RICO suit against majority shareholders because the
shareholders' action was not derivative), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Crocker v. FDIC, 826
F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988). But see FDIC v. American Bank Trust
Shares, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 302 (D.S.C. 1976), vacated and remanded, 558 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1977),
in which the district court stayed a shareholder suit for fraud and deceit pending the outcome of
FDIC litigation against bank officers and directors but declined to rule on an FDIC right to priority:
The court is presently also of the view that FDIC is entitled to a priority over subordinated
capital noteholders with respect to any recovery from directors and officers, and any policy
insuring said persons. As a general rule, equity prefers the claims of innocent general
creditors over the claims of shareholders or subordinated creditors deceived by officers of
the corporation. However, before making afinal determination on thispoint, the court at a
proper time will give all parties an opportunity to be heard on the issue of priority of the
disbursement of funds recovered by any party.
Id. at 307-08 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). On remand, the district court did not make any
further findings concerning an FDIC priority over shareholders on the recovery from officers and
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law, the Sixth Circuit has accorded the FDIC a priority,49 but the
Fourth50 and Eleventh5 l Circuits have explicitly rejected an FDIC prior-
ity. In the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, state law on damages collection
governs disputes between the FDIC and bank shareholders. Although
states are free to adopt a rule of FDIC priority, no state has yet done so.
Rather, most states have opted for the rule that when a defendant's assets
cannot satisfy both the FDIC's and shareholders' claims, the FDIC will
compete equally with shareholders to collect damages on a pro-rata or
first-in-time, first-in-right basis.5 2
The basic issue dividing the circuits is whether federal courts should
create a federal common law rule that would allow the FDIC to collect
damages or to negotiate settlement awards before depository institution
shareholders have an opportunity to do so. Such a rule would apply even
if the shareholders ified suit or began settlement negotiation before the
FDIC. Although United States v. Kimbell Foods, Ina 5 3 is not directly on
point on this issue, it is the leading Supreme Court case concerning fed-
eral common law priorities for the administration of federal programs.
The issue in Kimbell Foods was whether the SBA and FHA have
priority over other, even senior and statutory, lienholders in the foreclo-
sure of collateral.5 4 Kimbell Foods involved two separate actions consoli-
dated by the Supreme Court.55 In one action, the SBA claimed that its
lien securing a loan it guaranteed took priority over a private lien that
arose out of a security interest that preceded the federal guarantee.5 6 The
district court held that federal law controlled the controversy and cre-
ated a federal common law rule that federal statutory liens take priority
over state and private liens.57 Although agreeing that federal law gov-
erns the SBA loan program, the Fifth Circuit fashioned a rule that, in-
stead of according the federal agency absolute priority, incorporated
UCC priorities based on order of perfection. 58
directors. See FDIC v. American Bank Trust Shares, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.C. 1978), affid,
629 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1980).
49. See Gaff, 919 F.2d at 396.
50. See Howard, 916 F.2d at 170.
51. See Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1546.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 140-45.
53. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
54. See id at 718.
55. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'1 Bank, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977) (the SBA case);
United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977) (the FHA case).
56. See Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Natl Bank, 401 F. Supp. 316, 319 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
57. See id at 321-22. The court determined that the federal rule fixing priority between federal
liens and state created liens is that a non-federal lien only takes priority if it is "both earlier in time
and choate at the time the federal lien arises." Id The court defined choate liens as only those liens
reduced to judgment, regardless of perfection under state law. See id at 322.
58. See Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 503 (5th Cir. 1977).
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In the second case consolidated into Kimbell Foods, the FHA
claimed that its federal contractual security interest in a tractor was su-
perior to a subsequent repairman's lien.59 The district court granted
summary judgment for the repairman's lienholder and held that the re-
pairman's lien was superior to the FH-A's because both federal and state
law accord priority to such liens.6° The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part, and held that federal common law governs the
rights and liabilities of parties in suits arising from FHA loan transac-
tions, but that the UCC must guide the federal common law.61
The Supreme Court consolidated these cases and granted certiorari
to determine whether, in the absence of a federal statute setting priorities,
contractual liens arising from the SBA and FHA loan programs take
automatic priority over other liens. The Court ruled that they do not.62
The Court's analysis consisted of two steps. First, the Court noted that
federal law applies to federal loan programs.63 Second, the Court con-
ducted a three-factor test, which considered the necessity of a uniform
rule, the impact state law would otherwise have on the programs, and the
extent to which a uniform rule would frustrate state commercial prac-
tices. 64 The Court concluded that the SBA and FHA loan programs did
not require a uniform federal common law rule of priority and declined
to override state law on lien priorities.65
The Eleventh Circuit in FDIC v. Jenkins66 and the Sixth Circuit in
Gaff v. FDIC67 addressed an issue closely related to that addressed in
Kimbell Foods: whether the FDIC should have a priority over bank
shareholders in suits against bank officers and directors. Both Jenkins
and Gaff held that a federal common law rule of priority for the FDIC,
as for any federal agency, must satisfy the Kimbell Foods criteria.
Although the two courts reached opposite conclusions, neither the Elev-
enth nor the Sixth Circuits adequately explored this question under the
Kimbell Foods analysis.
59. See Crittenden, 563 F.2d at 679.
60. See id
61. See id at 680-81.
62. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 718.
63. See id at 726.
64. See id at 728-29. For an in-depth discussion of the Kimbell Foods analysis, see infra Part
III.
65. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 733.
66. 888 F.2d 1537 (1lth Cir. 1989).
67. 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Howard v. Haddad, 916 F.2d 167, 170 (4th Cir. 1990)
(explicitly adopting the Jenkins holding).
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A. FDIC v. Jenkins
In FDIC v. Jenkins,68 the Eleventh Circuit denied the FDIC a prior-
ity over bank shareholders when it attempted to collect the proceeds of
any settlement or to levy on any judgment against the officers and direc-
tors of a Florida bank. In Jenkins, shareholders were concurrently suing
many of the same defendants for securities fraud, common law fraud,
civil conspiracy, negligence, and civil theft.69 The FDIC brought a sepa-
rate action in a U.S. district court against the shareholders seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the FDIC's claims against the bank-related
defendants should have priority over the shareholders' claims against the
same defendants.70 The district court held that several policy considera-
tions supported the FDIC's position and granted priority to the FDIC.71
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed on two grounds. First, the
court refused to recognize an "implicit" FDIC priority in FIRREA.72
Second, the court applied the federal common law analysis set forth in
Kimbell Foods to the issue of whether the FDIC should have priority.73
The court concluded that the nature of FDIC litigation against bank-
related defendants does not require a uniform federal common law rule
of priority.74
Notwithstanding the court's concession that the "preservation of the
permanent insurance fund is vital to the continued health of the nation's
banking system," it held that the FDIC must nevertheless limit itself to
measures "authorized in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to maximize
recovery to the fund."' 75 The holding reflected Congress's specific rejec-
tion of an explicit claims priority provision during the drafting of its
most recent banking legislation, FIRREA. 76 This rejection indicated to
the court a lack of statutory authority for the FDIC's contention that a
priority is implicit in FIRREA because without such a provision "the
68. 888 F.2d 1537 (1lth Cir. 1989).
69. Id. at 1538.
70. Id.
71. The court considered shareholders' knowledge of general risk when making investments
and the inequity of making general creditors share equally with shareholders. The court fashioned
an FDIC priority by enjoining the shareholders from collecting proceeds of any settlement with, or
levying on any judgment against, the bank-related defendants and by ordering that any judgment
obtained by shareholders state its subordination to judgments obtained by the FDIC. See id. at
1539.
72. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.A.). See Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1541, 1544. For a discussion of whether Congress implicitly
intended the FDIC to have a priority in the FIRREA amendments to the FDIA, see infira Part IV.
73. See Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1545-46.
74. See id at 1546.
75. Id at 1541.
76. An FDIC priority provision included in a Senate version of FIRREA, see S. 774, § 214(o),
101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990), is conspicuously absent from the enacted version.
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FDIC could not carry out its alleged statutory mission unless it had the
ability to assert priority over the shareholders. ' 77 The court reasoned
that Congress rejected the provision so as not to deter private suits
against officers and directors of failed institutions. 78 Thus, the court re-
fused to "fill the interstices of federal legislation" 79 with "judicial expan-
sion of the express powers and rights granted to the FDIC . . . by
Congress."80
The Eleventh Circuit's alternative holding discussed the Kimbell
Foods prerequisites for the creation of a federal common law rule of pri-
ority. Although the court quoted the three factor test from Kimbell
Foods that "a court must consider," it declined to apply these considera-
tions to the Jenkins facts.81 The Eleventh Circuit apparently believed
that the Kimbell Foods analysis must be applied only in the presence of a
congressional goal: "Any [federal] rule fashioned must have its base on
the goal of effectuating congressional policy."' 82 Thus, because the court
did not find such a goal in the area of an FDIC priority over shareholders
on which to base the test: "We are not convinced that Congress consid-
ered collections against parties such as the bank-related defendants in
this case as a necessary part of the recovery to the deposit insurance
fund."'8 3 They concluded that "[a]ny such priority over third-party law-
suits will have to come from Congress, not this Court."184 The court
erred in assuming that the Kimbell Foods analysis required some kind of
threshold determination of a congressional goal and by, therefore, not
applying the analysis to the facts in Jenkins.
The Jenkins court further denied the FDIC's alternative contention
that it is entitled to a federal common law rule of priority based on an
analogy with the general principles of equitable subordination in bank-
ruptcy. 5 As embodied in federal bankruptcy law, the doctrine of equita-
ble subordination gives general creditors, represented by the bankruptcy
trustee, priority over shareholders in the distribution of the bank's assets.
The Jenkins court held, however, that the doctrine is inapplicable to pro-
ceedings "against solvent third-parties in non-derivative shareholder
77. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1541.
78. See id at 1538 n.1, 1540 n.5. Congress has considered a priority provision for the FDIC in
various recent banking bills. For a discussion of the congressional history of an FDIC priority
provision, see infia Part V.
79. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1978).
80. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1541.
81. See id at 1545.
82. Id. at 1546.
83. Idt
84. Idt
85. See idt at 1545. The Bankruptcy Code was not directly applicable to the controversy in the
case because it does not govern bank failures. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1988).
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suits,"' 86 such as the Jenkins shareholders' private suit against bank of-
ficers and directors.
B. Gaff v. FDIC
In Gaff v. FDIC,8 7 the Sixth Circuit erroneously drew an analogy
with the Kimbell Foods test to conclude, unlike Jenkins, that the FDIC
should have a priority under federal common law over the competing
claims of shareholders. 88 In Gaff, the FDIC became the receiver for the
National Bank of Traverse City, a small national bank in Michigan,
which allegedly became insolvent due to fraud and mismanagement. As
part of a purchase and assumption agreement in which the FDIC sold
the bank's assets and liabilities to a healthy bank, the FDIC, as receiver,
sold some assets to itself in its corporate capacity. Those assets included
the bank's claims for fraud and mismanagement against the officers and
directors of the bank.89
Purporting to apply the Kimbell Foods analysis to the question of
whether the FDIC should have a'priority in its collection of settlement
proceeds over bank shareholders with similar claims against bank-related
defendants, the Sixth Circuit created a federal common law rule to pro-
vide the FDIC with such a priority.9° Instead of applying the Kimbell
Foods test, however, the court distinguished the case from the facts in
Kimbell Foods, which denied lien priority to the SBA and FHA, by find-
ing that the national bank insurance system differs in two respects from
the loan programs of the SBA and FHA. 91 "First, the bank insurance
system needs national uniformity by its nature [because u]nlike the SBA
and the [FHA], the FDIC has not prepared itself for the application of
state law to its transactions." 92 Second, although the SBA and FH-A
have ample time to structure their transactions, "the FDIC must operate
under severe time constraints when it closes a bank."'93
86. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1545. The court expressed some hesitation in this part of the holding
because of the lack of consensus on the bankruptcy rights of shareholders in third-party actions:
[IThe 1978 revision of the Bankruptcy Code (Amended 1984) arguably approves of the
position that such shareholders may proceed in suits against third parties on an equal
status with general creditors. The express terms of section 510(b) of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code apply only to claims against the debtor or an affiliate of a debtor.
Id. at 1545 (citation omitted).
87. 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990).
88. See id at 387, 396.
89. Id. at 386. The court pointed out that the FDIC had already settled its claims against the
officers and directors with their liability insurer, contingent on the outcome of this case. According
to counsel in the case, the settlement nearly depleted the available insurance fund. lId
90. See id at 387.
91. See id. at 388.
92. I at 388-89.
93. Id. at 389.
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The Sixth Circuit found alternative support for an FDIC priority
rule in the "policies behind" FIRREA. 94 The court interpreted congres-
sional policy by reference to three provisions in FIRREA: "First, section
212(a) vests in the FDIC 'all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the
insured depository institution, and of any stockholder.., with respect to
the institution and the assets of the institution . . . .' This suit involves
the overall 'assets of the institution.' -95 Second, another subsection of
FIRREA provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of Fed-
eral law, the law of any State, or the constitution of any State, the
[FDIC], upon the payment [of insurance proceeds] ... shall be subro-
gated to all rights of the depositor against such institution or branch to
the extent of such payment or assumption. ' 96 The court noted that this
provision "demonstrate[s] Congress's intent to preempt state law by oc-
cupying the field of national bank insurance and the FDIC's rights. '97
Third, the Gaff court reasoned that FIRREA's cross guarantee provi-
sion-which requires solvent subsidiaries of a holding company to bear
the costs of a related subsidiary's failure-reveals that "the liability of
officers and directors of a bank are determined under federal law."98 Ac-
cording to the court, certain language in the legislative history of FIR-
REA indicates an explicit congressional intent to nationalize the law of
directors' and officers' liability:
Title II preempts State law with respect to claims brought by the
FDIC in any capcity [sic] against officers or directors of an insured
depository institution. The preemption allows the FDIC to pursue
claims for gross negligence or any conduct that demonstrates a greater
disregard of a duty of care.99
This alternative ground for an FDIC priority is quite problematic.
The court does not find authority for the priority in the statute, but
rather in a general notion of congressional intent to create an arsenal of
power for the FDIC. What is troubling is that the Kimbell Foods analy-
sis itself incorporates a consideration of congressional policy in its three-
fold balancing test. It is not clear, however, what authority the court
94. See id. at 390-91. The court also noted that a priority would be consistent with the "na-
tional policies expressed in the Bankruptcy Code" and the principle of equitable subordination. See
id. at 394.
95. Id at 390 (quoting FIRREA, § 212(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (1989)) (omissions
appear in the opinion). It is unclear why the court claims that the "assets of the institution" include
a cause of action against officers and directors and yet holds that this provision is not dispositive but
merely indicative of congressional policy.
96. Id (quoting FIRREA, § 212(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (1989)).
97. Id. at 391.
98. Id. Cross guarantees enable the FDIC to recover part of the costs of liquidating or aiding a
failed institution from solvent institutions in the same holding company. 1989 FDIC REPORT, Supra
note 1, at 57.
99. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 398 (1989).
[Vol. 41:329
FDIC PRIORITY OF CLAIMS
uses to renew the inquiry into congressional policy outside of the con-
structs of the Kimbell Foods analysis.
III. APPLICATION OF THE KIMBELL FOODS TEST
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. ,o established a two-part analy-
sis to evaluate the necessity of a federal common law rule of claim prior-
ity for federal agencies. The analysis examines two issues: first, whether
Congress intended federal law to govern the agency; and second, whether
federal courts should fashion a uniform priority rule or incorporate state
law.
In Kimbell Foods, the Court applied this analysis to reject the argu-
ments of the SBA and FHA that the liens held by them should be gov-
erned by a uniform federal rule of first priority.101 The SBA and FHA
claimed in Kimbell Foods, as did the FDIC in the instant controversy,
that protection of federal interests justified a uniform rule of priority for
federal claims against assets. 102 The Court based its rejection of the
SBA's and FHA's argument on the determination that the purpose of a
uniform rule is to promote speed, which the SBA's and FI-A's loan eval-
uations did not require. 10 3 Just as the SBA's and FHA's argument failed
in Kimbell Foods, the FDIC's argument in favor of a uniform priority
rule over bank shareholders in the collection of judgments against bank
officers and directors should fail because the FDIC does not, and cannot,
require speed in restructuring disputes.
As stated above, the first step in the Kimbell analysis requires a de-
termination of whether Congress intended federal law to govern the op-
erations of the federal agency under review. The FDIC easily satisfies
this initial hurdle. A long line of cases supports the argument that fed-
eral law applies to federal agencies charged with regulating federal
programs. 104
100. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
101. See id at 740.
102. See id, at 729.
103. See id. at 732-33.
104. In Kimbell Foods, the Court noted that it has "consistently held that federal law governs
questions involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide federal programs." Id.
at 726; see also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) ("The duties
imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it... find their roots in ... federal
sources. In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the
governing rule of law according to their own standards.") (footnote and citation omitted); Gunter v.
Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 869 (11th Cir.) ("[Tihe FDIC operates under authority derived from a
specific statutory scheme passed by Congress in exercise of a 'constitutional function or power' to
protect and stabilize the national banking system. Hence, federal law applies."), cert denied, 459
U.S. 826 (1982). But see Trigo v. FDIC, 847 F.2d 1499, 1502-03 n.4 (1lth Cir. 1988) (holding that
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The problem with applying a federal common law priority rule to
FDIC judgment collections lies in the second prong of the Kimbell Foods
analysis-whether a federal common law rule of priority is necessary to
fill this gap in federal legislation.105 Generally, when no federal statute
governs the issue of priority 6f liens or claims held by federal agencies, 106
federal courts have discretion to fashion a federal common law rule.10 7
Kimbell Foods established a three-factor balancing test to determine
when federal courts should exercise this discretion. This test primarily
focuses on whether a uniform rule is necessary to protect federal
interests:108
[First,] federal programs that "by their nature are and must be uniform
in character throughout the Nation" necessitate formulation of con-
trolling federal rules .... [Second, a]part from considerations of uni-
formity, we must also determine whether application of state law
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs. If so, we
must fashion special rules solicitous of those federal interests. [Third,]
our choice-of-law inquiry must consider the extent to which applica-
tion of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predi-
cated on state law 109
As the following analysis will show, the three factors enumerated in
Kimbell Foods reveal that courts should not establish a uniform priority
rule for the FDIC over shareholders in the collection of damages and
settlement awards against bank-related defendants.
federal law governs the corporate function of the FDIC because it operates in exercise of a constitu-
tional function or power, but the FDIC as receiver does not pursue a strong federal policy and so is
governed by state law of receiverships).
105. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
106. Resort to federal common law is only necessary where Congress has not provided for treat-
ment of the matter under consideration. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1981).
107. The Court in Kimbell Foods specifically directed federal courts to supplement statutes:
That the statutes authorizing these federal... programs do not specify the appropriate rule
of decision in no way limits the reach of federal law. It is precisely when Congress has not
spoken "'in an area comprising issues substantially related to an established program of
government operation,'" that... federal courts [should] fill the interstices of federal legis-
lation "according to their own standards."
440 U.S. at 727 (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) and
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).
108. The Supreme Court held in Kimbell Foods that "[c]ontroversies directly affecting the opera-
tions of federal programs, although governed by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to
uniform federal rules." Id. at 727-28. If a uniform rule is not necessary, then the federal rule will
incorporate the relevant state law. Id; see also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979)
(holding that Indian title is a matter of federal law, but adopting Nebraska law as the appropriate
federal rule). For a discussion of the circular practices of generating federal law and then adopting
state law as the federal rule, see Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57
N.Y.U. L. REv. 933, 964-1002 (1982).
109. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354
(1966)) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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A. Federal Programs That by Their Nature Must Be Uniform in
Character
The first factor of Kimbell Foods's balancing test is whether a uni-
form rule of federal priority is necessary to achieve Congress's goals for a
federal program. Thus, the crucial determination is whether the federal
agency, because of the nature of its goals, can operate only if it has a
uniform rule that gives priority to federal interests.
Federal courts applying the first factor of the Kimbell Foods test to a
possible rule of priority for a federal program have consistently focused
their structural analysis on whether the agency's operations require a
quick determination of how to proceed.110 Thus, speed is the primary
justification advanced by the FDIC and relied upon by the courts for
uniformly placing the interests of a federal agency over the interests of
private individuals.
The crux of the circuit split between Jenkins and Gaff is a difference
over whether the decision on how best to manage a failed institution gen-
erates a need for speed in FDIC judgment collection. The Sixth Circuit
in Gaff found that speed was necessary in deciding whether to liquidate
the institution or to enter a purchase and assumption transaction, and
thus found that the FDIC needed a uniform rule of priority.1 In so
doing, the Sixth Circuit relied on a line of cases in which federal courts
have created federal common law rules to facilitate the FDIC's valuation
of bank assets in determining the cost of entering into a purchase and
assumption transaction." 2 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
these cases as not analogous to the Jenkins facts because of the practical
impossibility of including tentative future judgment income in the failure
management decision." 3
A significant issue in determining whether the FDIC should have a
uniform rule of priority is thus whether the precedent dealing with
purchase and assumption transactions is analogous to the judgment col-
lection cases. As the following discussion will show, this precedent is not
analogous, and speed is not a crucial factor in the FDIC's judgment col-
lections; therefore, the FDIC should not have priority over the interests
of depository institution shareholders.
110. See FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1990) (granting federal
common law priority over borrowers to facilitate FDIC's quick review of bank records), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
111. See Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 1990).
112. See id. at 387-88.
113. See FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1540 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989).
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1. The Need for Speed in the Purchase and Assumption Cost Test
Cases. Before engaging in a purchase and assumption transaction, the
FDIC must determine that the deposit insurance fund would suffer a
greater loss in a liquidation than it would in a purchase and assumption
transaction.114 When the FDIC evaluates the merits of a purchase and
assumption transaction, it applies what is known as the cost test. This
test provides an estimate1 5 of how much of a bank's assets the purchas-
ing institution will return to the FDIC as receiver and the FDIC receiver
will in turn convey, along with its causes of action, to the FDIC as corpo-
rate insurer.116 The cost of a purchase and assumption transaction is
equal to the difference between a bank's liabilities and its collectible as-
sets; this is the amount the FDIC must pay in cash to the purchasing
institution in exchange for its assumption of an institution's liabilities.
The cost test compares that number to the cost of liquidation, which is
$100,000 (or less for depositors with accounts of less than $100,000) mul-
tiplied by the number of depositors. If the cost of a purchase and as-
sumption transaction is less than the cost of liquidation, the FDIC will
quickly prepare for a sale of the bank's assets and liabilities to a solvent
institution.
Federal courts have concluded in several cases that the realization of
the FDIC's goal of promoting stability and confidence in the banking
system through purchase and assumption transactions requires a uniform
federal rule of priority for the FDIC's right to collect on returned assets
over borrowers' rights to assert defenses. 17 The FDIC often makes the
decision to enter a purchase and assumption transaction overnight so
114. The FDIC has broad discretion to determine which disposition is most cost-effective. See
12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1988) ("No assistance shall be provided... in an amount in excess of
that amount which the corporation determines to be reasonably necessary to save the cost of liquidat-
ing... such uninsured bank[s].") (emphasis added).
115. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 870 (1lth Cir.) ("Because of the time constraints
involved, the only method of evaluating potential loss open to the FDIC is relying on the books and
records of the failed bank to estimate what assets would be returned by a purchasing bank and to
estimate which of those assets ultimately would be collectible."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
116. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (West 1989).
117. For a discussion of how a uniform federal rule of priority against borrowers and other
creditors facilitates a purchase and assumption transaction (P&A), see FDIC v. Bank of Boulder,
911 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1990):
[Without a] uniform rule allowing FDIC/Corporation to acquire nontransferable assets of
failed banks in the course of a P & A transactions[,] ... FDIC/Corporation... [would be]
faced with an enormous administrative burden in trying to determine whether or not to
finance a P & A.... To require the FDIC/Corporation to [determine the transferability of
every asset] under the stringent time constraints of a P & A is asking the impossible.
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that a bank can reopen under the purchasing bank's name the next busi-
ness day. Therefore, the FDIC must conduct the cost test with the ut-
most speed. 118
The general rationale of cases dealing with purchase and assumption
transactions is that if the FDIC were not permitted to rely on a bank's
records, the FDIC could not conduct an accurate cost test and, therefore,
could not use the purchase and assumption method of assisting banks.
The Sixth Circuit in FDIC v. Wood 119 articulated this dilemma: "[T]he
essence of a purchase and assumption transaction is speed. If the FDIC
is forced to examine the bank's files to determine the value of its notes in
light of the defenses to them, the transaction will not take place."120
The federal common law rule of priority enables the FDIC to rely
on a bank's records by preempting various state law defenses that bor-
rowers might assert-such as usury or unlawful transfer of letters of
credit-in order to be excused from payment on a loan. Such state law
defenses render a financial institution's assets uncertain. Without the
federal common law priority, the FDIC would have to litigate each dis-
puted claim to determine whether it is collectible. Such a system would
prevent the FDIC from conducting a cost test, which is based on the
accumulated value of collectible assets, and thus run afoul of Congress's
Hence, the option of handling bank failures through the P & A method would be fore-
closed. Such a result runs directly counter to the policies behind the creation of the
FDIC-promoting stability and confidence in the banking system.
Id at 1474-75. But see FDIC v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392, 1402 (D. Kan. 1985) (holding that a
uniform federal holder in due course rule is not necessary to the FDIC's assumption of non-negotia-
ble instruments because these instruments represent a minority of a bank's assets and thus have a
minimal effect on the FDIC's cost test), rev'd 856 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1988).
The FDIC argues that the prospect of collecting judgments against bank officers and directors is
an important factor in performing the cost test. Jenkins addressed this argument, but found that the
statement of an FDIC bank liquidation specialist who admitted that the possibility of such judgment
had "not been identified as assets and that it would be impossible to evaluate such claims" indicated
that this sort of judgment is not a component of the cost test. FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1540
n.4 (11th Cir. 1989).
118. Speed was a primary concern in Bank of Boulder:
Making the determination of whether a P & A would be less expensive than a simple
liquidation requires a quick review of the failed bank's books and records. This review of
assets must be quick-usually overnight--because a P & A transaction requires the bank to
reopen quickly in order to maintain the going concern value of the failed bank.
911 F.2d at 1470 (emphasis added).
119. 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
120. Id at 161; see also Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
826 (1982):
[D]ecisions concerning the appropriate method of dealing with a bank failure must be
made with extraordinary speed if the going concern value of the failed institution is to be
preserved. Subjecting the FDIC to the additional burden of considering the impact of
possibly variable state law on the rights involved could significantly impair the FDIC's
ability to choose between the liquidation and purchase-and-assumption alternatives in han-
dling a bank failure.
Id at 869.
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intention that the FDIC conduct a cost test before entering a purchase
and assumption transaction.1 21 . In response to this problem, the Sixth
Circuit created a uniform federal rule of priority for the FDIC in Wood
by granting the FDIC holder in due course status, which exempted the
FDIC from state usury law defenses to interest debt. 122 More recently,
the Tenth Circuit created a similar rule of FDIC priority in FDIC v.
Bank of Boulder123 by preempting state restrictions on transfers of letters
of credit. 124
In Wood, Bank of Boulder, and other cost test cases, the courts con-
cluded that, because of the need for speed and accuracy in the cost test,
the FDIC could not conduct purchase and assumption transactions with-
out a uniform rule that granted it priority over borrowers and co-credi-
tors by preempting state law defenses to FDIC claims. The effect of a
uniform rule in this context is to allow the FDIC to rely on a bank's
written records without regard to various state law provisions concerning
secret agreements with outsiders, contributory negligence, and other per-
sonal defenses.
The Sixth Circuit approached Gaff,125 a case dealing with collection
of damages from wrongdoing bank directors, as if it were essentially a
cost test case. The court assumed that the FDIC required an estimate of
the value of a judgment against the bank directors in order to accurately
conduct the cost test.126 The court then reasoned by analogy from the
cost test cases and concluded that the FDIC should be accorded a prior-
ity over shareholders.1 27 The court's error in Gaff was that it equated the
valuation of damages against bank directors with the valuation of bank
assets. However, whereas the FDIC can and must conduct asset valua-
tion with speed for purposes of the cost test, a valuation of damages nec-
essarily awaits the conclusion of litigation or settlement negotiation. A
121. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988), the FDIC may enter into a purchase and assumption
transaction whenever, in the judgment of the Board of Directors, such an action will reduce the risk
or avert the threatened loss to the FDIC.
122. See Wood, 758 F.2d at 161.
123. 911 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1990).
124. The court reasoned that a rule of priority for the FDIC enabled the FDIC to achieve the
goal of purchase and assumption transactions:
A uniform rule permitting FDIC/Corporation to acquire otherwise nontransferable assets
in a P & A eliminates the need for detailed examination of the failed bank's assets and of
varying laws. Cost estimates can be made quickly and with greater accuracy, and P & A's
can thereby be implemented with fewer risks and with the necessary speed. Because the P
& A is an extremely valuable tool, such a uniform rule furthers the obvious advantages of P
& A's and the interests of the federal deposit insurance program.
Id. at 1475.
125. Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990).
126. See id. at 389.
127. See il
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proper application of Kimbell Foods's first factor to judgment and collec-
tion cases focuses on whether a uniform rule of priority for the FDIC
over bank shareholders is necessary for an efficient management of the
FDIC's decision on how to handle its receivership.
2. Speed as a Justification for Uniformity. A priority in judgment
and settlement collection does not facilitate the FDIC's decisionmaking
because, irrespective of priorities, even the FDIC admits that damages
are too speculative to contribute to the cost test before a determination of
liability has occurred. 128 Thus, an analogy to the cost test cases cannot
answer the first Kimbell Foods factor because speed is the premise for its
satisfaction in the cost test cases, and it is precisely this premise that the
judgment collection cases lack.
Kimbell Foods itself addressed the issue of speed as a justification for
a uniform rule of federal priority. 129 The SBA and FHA argued that the
security interests guaranteeing their loans required a uniform rule of pri-
ority over other lienholders because they did not have time during loan
application reviews to evaluate state law.130 The Court held, however,
that the necessity of a painstakingly lengthy evaluation of the credit wor-
thiness of loan applicants indicated that there was ample time for the
SBA and FHA to research and to satisfy security interest requirements
under state law.' 3 ' Thus, the SBA and FHA did not require a uniform
rule to facilitate operation of their federal loan programs; speed was not
imperative and did not create a need for uniformity. Similarly, the fact
that FDIC's litigation against bank officers and directors typically takes
years to complete precludes the FDIC from fixing a value on a judgment
against bank officers and directors. Even if the FDIC considers speed in
the judgment valuation to be imperative, speed cannot be achieved;
therefore, speed does not create a need for uniformity in judgment
collection.
The Sixth Circuit correctly observed in Gaff that the framework of a
bank closure must often be built overnight. 3 2 The court, however, erro-
neously ignored the fact that judgments against officers and directors
have no relevance to the FDIC's decision whether to liquidate a bank or
128. See FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1540 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989) (FDIC bank liquidation
specialist revealed in deposition that the FDIC has not identified claims against third parties as
assets for purposes of the cost test because the value of such claims is "impossible to evaluate").
129. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 732-33.
130. See id
131. See id
132. See Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[TIhe FDIC must operate under
severe time constraints when it closes a bank. Unlike the SBA and [FHA], which have time to
structure their transactions, some FDIC bank closure transactions occur overnight.").
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to sell its collectible assets and liabilities to a solvent institution. There
are two reasons why such judgments have no relevance to this decision.
First, the FDIC uses its priority in cost test situations to rely on the
face value of a bank's assets. Claims against bank officers and directors
do not have face value until they are fully litigated; thus, the FDIC can-
not calculate a definite figure to represent a judgment or settlement in the
cost test. A federal common law rule of priority for the FDIC over
shareholders could only facilitate the FDIC's decision to liquidate or to
enter a purchase and assumption transaction if the outcome of its litiga-
tion against the officers and directors had concluded and the FDIC had
already been awarded a specific amount of money. In such a situation,
an analogy to the purchase and assumption cases would be appropriate;
priority for the FDIC would enable the agency to include a fixed amount
in its cost calculation without concern that the number would change.133
Until the FDIC has been awarded any damages from officers or direc-
tors, however, it cannot reasonably fix a value on those damages to in-
clude in the cost test.
Second, a judgment against bank officers and directors never affects
the valuation of returned assets because the FDIC never ultimately sells
its cause of action against bank officers and directors to the purchasing
institution. 134 Whether or not the FDIC decides to liquidate a failing
bank and pay off up to $100,000 per account or to enter a purchase and
assumption transaction, the FDIC will retain its potential cause of action
against officers and directors. Any judgment resulting from such a cause
of action is thus irrelevant to the cost test the FDIC undertakes. Thus,
although the FDIC must conduct the cost test with speed, it is not neces-
sary that the FDIC arrive at any quick valuation of a judgment because
the value of the judgment has no effect on the cost test.
133. It is arguable, however, that a federal common law rule of FDIC priority over shareholders,
even limited to situations in which all suits have already concluded, would still not pass the balanc-
ing test because the purpose of a federal common law rule in all these cases is to promote predictabil-
ity in the cost test. After the FDIC has already conducted its litigation, it would presumably be
aware of its priority in collection against liable defendants or their insurance companies and able to
form a quick judgment of its effect of its priority on the cost of a purchase and assumption transac-
tion. Thus, once predictability is achieved, the need for a uniform federal common law rule disap-
pears. See FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984):
[Tihe primary reason for such a [federal common law] rule is to allow the FDIC to reach a
considered opinion that a purchase and assumption transaction will better protect the
FDIC from loss than a liquidation. To the extent the FDIC knows of a defense, its ability
to form this judgment is unimpaired. Thus, if the FDIC actually knows of any... enrich-
ment defense at the time it enters the purchase and assumption transaction, it is subject to
the defense.
Id. at 518. Other cases have held, however, that knowledge is immaterial. See, e.g, FDIC v.
Merchants Nat'l Bank, 725 F.2d 634, 640 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 114-17 for a description of the mechanics of the FDIC's
cost test.
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In conclusion, an analogy between an FDIC priority in judgment
collection and an FDIC priority in asset collection (for purposes of the
decision between the liquidation and purchase and assumption remedies
for bank failures) is inappropriate. Whereas the FDIC must be able to
value bank assets with great speed to manage efficiently a bank failure,
the FDIC does not require, nor is it even possible to require, speed in its
assessment of the value of a judgment against bank officers and directors.
Thus, the first factor in the Kimbell Foods analysis militates against an
FDIC priority. The FDIC does not require a uniform priority rule over
depository institution shareholders in judgment collection against officers
and directors.
B. The Effect of the Application of State Law on the Specific
Objectives of a Federal Program
The second factor in the Kimbell Foods balancing test is whether the
application of state law to the operations of the federal program would
frustrate the program's goals. Before conducting any meaningful sub-
stantive evaluation of an FDIC priority over depository institution share-
holders in light of this second factor, however, it is important to
comprehend the exact inquiry this factor requires.
Kimbell Foods's second factor is analytically similar to the first. In
fact, in Gaff, the Sixth Circuit collapsed the first factor (necessity for
uniformity) into the second factor (whether application of state law
would frustrate the FDIC's goal of assisting failed or failing banks). 135
In that case, the court answered the first factor of the balancing test with
a statement that responded to the second factor of the balancing test:
"the FDIC has not prepared itself for the application of state law to its
transactions." 136 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit referred to the uniformity
argument (the first factor inquiry) in the cases it used as support for its
contention that state law would impede the FDIC's goals (the second
factor inquiry). For example, the Sixth Circuit cited FDIC v. Bank of
Boulder's holding that the "FDIC may acquire [a] note not transferable
under state law because of need for uniformity" as support for its own
holding that an FDIC priority satisfies Kimbell Foods's second factor.1 37
135. See Gaff, 919 F.2d at 388-89.
136. Id. at 389.
137. Id. (citing FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990)).
Vol. 41:329]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Kimbell Foods specifically held that the need for uniformity and the
impact of state law are separate inquiries. 138 Thus, although the distinc-
tion between Kimbell Foods's first and second factors is subtle, any appli-
cation of the Kimbell Foods analysis must comprehend this difference.
One workable distinction between the two focuses on the difference be-
tween the burdening effect of compliance with up to fifty state laws and
the substantive effect of applying a typical state statute to the federal
program. This distinction seems to be the one the Tenth Circuit adopted
in Bank of Boulder when it found that the state law, which restricted
transfer of certain kinds of assets, prevented the FDIC as receiver from
transferring certain returned assets to the FDIC as insurer:
If transfer restrictions are enforced against FDIC/Corporation, it may
not be able to collect on the nontransferable assets and P & A's become
more expensive. In light of the congressional requirement that P & A's
be less costly than liquidation, increasing the cost of P & A's could
very well prevent P & A's in many cases. Elimination of P & A's as an
option for FDIC/Receiver would cause a great interference in the ef-
fective performance of the FDIC's mission to stabilize the banking
industry. 139
Thus, a proper application of the second factor to an FDIC priority over
depository institution shareholders in collecting judgment and settlement
awards requires a review of the method by which state law determines
distribution of assets to judgment creditors.
The laws of the various states governing distribution of a judgment
debtor's assets to judgment creditors have undergone extensive develop-
ment in this country to the point of great sophistication.1 40 Unless a
debtor's assets are sufficient to satisfy all judgment and other obligations,
state laws concerning receivership will govern the distribution of the
debtor's assets to secured and unsecured creditors.141 A judgment credi-
tor who is diligent enough to levy under her judgment before the judg-
ment debtor's estate goes into receivership acquires a lien that a receiver
138. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 ("Apart from considerations of uniformity, we must also
determine whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal pro-
grams.") (emphasis added).
139. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d at 1476 (emphasis added).
140. See 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 4 (1952).
141. 44 CJ.S. Insolvency § 6(d) (1945) ("The persons qualified to file a petition [for involuntary
insolvency under state law] are determined by the statutes, which usually accord the right to 'any
creditor.' ").
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cannot divest.142 Under state "grab laws," the priorities of these compet-
ing liens are a function of chronology: The judgment creditor who first
can levy under judicial process wins first satisfaction. 143
Once a receiver has been appointed, however, no creditor can obtain
any preference by lien, nor is the receiver subject to attachment, execu-
tion, garnishment, or other similar process. 144 If the debtor's estate goes
into receivership before a judgment creditor reduces her claim to a lien,
then that creditor's interest will take an equal pro-rata dividend with all
other unsecured creditors of the debtor's estate.145
An FDIC priority of claims does not pass the third factor because
these laws are not difficult to apply. The compliance burden for the
FDIC to determine which party, as between itself and a shareholder, the
state law would allow first to collect a judgment is minimal: The first to
levy under its judgment becomes the senior lienholder. Therefore, an
application of Kimbell Foods's second factor reveals that an FDIC prior-
ity that would preempt state law is inappropriate because the FDIC's
goals would not be frustrated by deferring to laws easily applied and con-
sistent among the states.
142. The mechanics of turning a judgment into a lien are relatively simple. The creditor must
levy execution on the judgment by delivering to the sheriff a writ of execution (to seize tangible
property) or a writ of garnishment (to seize intangible property). 33 C.J.S. Executions § 88 (1942).
The sheriff's seizure of the debtor's property creates a judgment lien in favor of the creditor. Id
§ 123. This lien is not destroyed by the subsequent appointment of a receiver of the debtor's estate.
Id. § 128(a).
In some states, however, as in the federal Bankruptcy Code, attachment and execution liens that
were levied within a certain period of the insolvency proceedings are dissolved by those proceedings
under state insolvency statutes. See, eg., Belfast Say. Bank v. Lancey, 45 A. 523 (Me. 1900); Wright
v. Dawson, 18 N.E. 1 (Mass. 1888).
In certain cases, when a plaintiff shows proper grounds, she may be able to obtain a writ of
attachment before judgment. Attachment is a provisional, statutory remedy that enables the plaintiff
to attach the defendant's property, after service of a complaint and summons and before judgment,
to secure the payment of a subsequent judgment. 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 3(a) (1980); id § 23. If the
plaintiff ultimately obtains a judgment in her favor, she must perpetuate the lien by ordering the
sheriff to levy under the writ of attachment. Id § 170.
143. 53 C.J.S. Liens § 14(b) (1987).
144. 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 134 (1952); see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Kentuckiana Sales Co.,
423 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968) (finding that judgment creditor did not obtain a valid lien on
property in possession of receiver before execution of judgment).
145. 44 C.J.S. Insolvency § 14(e)(2)(b) (1945) ("Dividends are based on the claim as proved and
allowed, and the stage of the proceedings.... In insolvency practice, a dividend is a proportional
payment to the creditors out of the insolvent estate."); see also In re Farmers' Exch. Bank, 37
S.W.2d 936 (Mo. 1931) (general creditors are entitled to all of the assets belonging to the debtor).
It is arguable that a judgment claim that comes within the ambit of an officer's or director's
professional liability insurance policy has a special right to that policy under the law of constructive
trusts. This argument depends on an analogy between an insurance fund for the benefit of judgment
claimants and a trust fund for the benefit of certain beneficiaries. Under state receivership laws, trust
fund beneficiaries are entitled to collection on the trust fund as against general creditors. See Wil-
liams v. S.M. Smith Ins. Agency, 84 S.E. 235, 236 (W. Va. 1915).
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C. Potential Disruption of Commercial Relations Predicated on State
Law
The third factor in the Kimbell Foods balancing test is whether a
uniform federal rule would disrupt commercial relations predicated on
state law. In applying this factor in Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court
held that adopting a uniform rule of first priority for the voluntary fed-
eral loan programs of the SBA and FHA would significantly interfere
with the settled expectations of other lienholders under state law.146
Bank shareholders are the parties most affected by an FDIC priority
over bank shareholders in litigation against and settlements with bank
officers and directors. Therefore, Kimbell Foods's third factor requires a
review of the expectations of bank shareholders with respect to litigation
and damages collection against officers and directors, and of how an
FDIC priority would affect those expectations.
Whether investors purchase bank stocks with the expectation that
they will be able to hold their officers and directors accountable for mis-
management or fraud is in dispute. The court in Gaff held that because
successful professional liability claims are so infrequent, bank share-
holder claims do not rise to the level of "settled commercial prac-
tices," 147 and therefore no settled commercial expectations1 48 would be
frustrated by a federal rule giving the FDIC priority.149
This argument ignores, however, the observed reality of tremendous
increases in shareholder litigation during periods of scandal and crisis 50
146. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 739.
147. Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 1990).
148. The Sixth Circuit uses the terms "expectations" and "practices" interchangeably. Whether
these terms suggest different standards is unclear, but possible. For example, the Kansas district
court in FDIC v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Kan. 1985), rev'd 856 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1988),
used the expectations standard to determine that a federal common law holder in due course rule
would disrupt existing use of non-negotiable instruments, but also held that application of state law
to the FDIC's assumption of non-negotiable instruments would not frustrate the FDIC's activities
because the frequency of such notes is negligible, i.e., not a settled commercial practice:
The reason there is little dashing of commercial expectations in cases involving negoti-
able instruments is that one who signs such an instrument can reasonably expect that he
will eventually be asked to pay a holder in due course. Granting the FDIC holder in due
course status after a bank's failure thus imposes no greater liability on the maker/drawer of
a negotiable instrument than he had reasonably expected to bear. However, one who signs
a non-negotiable instrument reasonably expects to avoid having to contend with a holder in
due course....
... By choosing not to comply with the requirements for negotiability, one who exe-
cutes a non-negotiable instrument makes a conscious decision not to waive any personal
defenses he might have.
Id. at 1402 (emphasis added).
149. See Gaff, 919 F.2d at 390.
150. In a ground-breaking study of shareholder litigation trends between 1971 and 1978,
Thomas M. Jones found that:
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such as the present. No empirical studies yet exist on the frequency of
bank shareholder litigation during this well-publicized period of crisis in
the banking and savings and loan industries. The publicity of this crisis,
however, has very likely stirred up litigation by outraged investors in
banks in the same way that the Watergate scandal generated a rash of
shareholder litigation over questionable political contributions. If this
prediction is accurate, bank shareholders who are troubled by news of
fraud and mismanagement in banks will certainly expect to be able to
hold their bank's officers and directors accountable for any misconduct.
Another concern in identifying the expectations of bank sharehold-
ers regarding litigation against officers and directors is whether the ex-
pectations of shareholders in national banks differ from those of
shareholders in state banks. The corporate structure of national banks is
determined by the National Bank Act and the Comptroller's regulations;
whereas the corporate structure of state banks varies according to state
law. This distinction may suggest that shareholders of national banks
expect federal law to govern their relationships with the bank.151 The
history of congressional efforts to preserve the dual banking system
through the "competitive equality" doctrine, however, rebuts this con-
tention. This doctrine constrains the permissible activities and services
of a national bank to the law of the state in which the national bank is
located, thus facilitating competitive equality between national and state
banks in each state.152 The competitive equality doctrine has been most
restrictive in the area of national bank branching, as governed by the
McFadden Act. 153 A long line of cases interpret the McFadden Act to
[A] significant portion of the suits included in [the] study resulted from revelations made
with respect to investigations into corporate political contributions, both domestic and for-
eign. Of the total 228 suits filed between January 1, 1971 and December 31, 1978, 53 (or
23.2%) complained only of payoffs, bribery, illegal contributions, or related matters. In
addition, several suits included bribery-related complaints along with other issues.
... [The number of political payoff-related suits rose sharply beginning in 1974 and
had the effect of] shiftling] the slope of the time trend line from negative to positive; with-
out these suits, the trend in the incidence of shareholder suits is actually downward.
Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class
Action Lawsuits 1971-1978, 60 B.U. L. REv. 306, 322 (1980).
151. Although Gaff did not provide any support for such a contention, it used the distinction to
distinguish Jenkins: "rThe failed bank in Jenkins was a state-chartered bank, not a national bank.
Thus, the policy reasons for applying federal law may differ somewhat in this case than in the Jen-
kins case." Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 3*84, 396 (6th Cir. 1990). Note that Howard v. Haddad, 916
F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying FDIC a federal common law rule of claims priority over share-
holders), also involved a state bank.
152. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking
System, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 677, 701-05 (1988).
153. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228, 1228 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
(1988)). The McFadden Act promotes equality between national and state banks by permitting
national bank branching only to the extent that branches may be established by state banks under
state law. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 256-61 (1966), provides an
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require the Comptroller of the Currency to apply state law branching
restrictions when considering national bank applications for branches. 154
Thus, investors in national banks can reasonably anticipate the applica-
tion of state law to the operation of a national bank, including the right
to pursue a cause of action against officers and directors for unsafe bank-
ing practices.
Kimbell Foods's third factor requires a court to determine that a
uniform federal rule of priority would not disrupt state commercial prac-
tices before according a federal agency such a rule. An FDIC priority
would stymie fraud and mismanagement suits by bank shareholders who
fear that at some point between their first investment in the litigation and
the ultimate receipt of an award the FDIC might decide to initiate its
own suit. Shareholders with good cases would be likely to experience
great intimidation by an FDIC priority over their interests in the collec-
tion of a judgment. A federal common law rule of priority encourages
FDIC usurpation of all successful officer and director liability suits. The
FDIC would simply have to wait until a court awarded damages to a
shareholder and then file suit before the shareholder could collect. The
FDIC's action would stay the shareholder's receipt of the award. Such a
systematic exploitation of shareholders would lead to a decrease in this
kind of shareholder action, which is otherwise beneficial for its deterrent
effect on management conduct. Moreover, an FDIC priority over bank
shareholders in the collection of judgments against officers and directors
could result in a general devaluation of bank stocks to reflect the defacto
excellent legislative history of the McFadden Act and the policy of competitive equality between
national and state banks:
The [McFadden Act] originated in the House and, in substance, proposed that both na-
tional and state banks be permitted to establish "inside" branches... in those States that
permitted branch banking at the time of the enactment of the bill. The intent of the Con-
gress to leave the question of the desirability of branch banking up to the States is indicated
by the fact that the Senate struck from the House bill the time limitation, thus permitting a
subsequent change in state law to have a corresponding effect on the authority of national
banks to engage in branching.
Id. at 258.
154. See eg., First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969) (holding that because Florida
does not confer branching privileges on state banks, the congressional policy of competitive equality
forecloses the Comptroller of the Currency from permitting a national bank to set up armored car or
stationary receptacle branches in Florida); First Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 465 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(holding that the Comptroller of the Currency must conform to the appropriate state's law on
branch banking), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1124 (1973); Springfield State Bank v. National State Bank,
459 F.2d 712, 717 (3rd Cir. 1972) (holding that in considering a national bank's branching applica-
tion, the Comptroller must "follow and apply the whole relevant statutory and decisional law of the
[appropriate] state as interpreted by its courts and applied to its state banks"); National Bank v.
Wayne Oakland Bank, 249 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1957) (holding that a branch of a national bank may
not be established even with the Comptroller's approval when that establishment is prohibited by
state statute), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
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deprivation of the right to sue bank officers and directors. 155 Thus, the
third factor in the Kimbell Foods analysis also argues against an FDIC
priority over shareholders in judgment collection because of the negative
effect an FDIC priority would have on shareholders' expectations regard-
ing the right to protect their equity interest against misconduct by bank
officials.
A federal rule of FDIC priority over financial institution sharehold-
ers fails each of Kimbell Foods's three factors. First, the FDIC does not
by its nature require a uniform rule. Second, application of state law
does not frustrate specific objectives of the federal deposit insurance sys-
tem. Third, application of a federal rule of priority would disrupt estab-
lished commercial relationships.
IV. FIRREA DoEs NOT IMPLICITLY GRANT THE FDIC PRIORITY
OVER BANK SHAREHOLDERS
The FDIC contends that a congressional intention to provide the
FDIC a priority over all other claimants in its suits against bank-related
defendants is implicit in FIRREA.' 56 Not only is the FDIC's assertion
completely unfounded, but the prospects for enactment of an express pri-
ority in the near future are minimal. A careful consideration of the legis-
lative history of FIRREA indicates that Congress has negatively
responded to the notion of an FDIC priority, and therefore has not "im-
plicitly" provided for such a priority in the current matrix of FDIC
powers.
155. A possible public policy counter-argument may be made that deprivation of shareholders'
rights to sue bank officers and directors, although unfair to the expectations of shareholders in the
short-run, would encourage shareholder scrutiny of bank stocks before failure, and thus induce re-
sponsible operation of banks by managers who fear shareholder disapproval. The conclusion that
the deprivation of shareholders' rights would lead to more responsible bank operation is questiona-
ble, however, because shareholder discipline probably does not prevent bank failure. Professor
Helen Garten suggests that changing bank failure policy to encourage more shareholders discipline
would not decrease bank failures for four reasons: (1) shareholders who are the last to receive distri-
bution of assets in the event of failure already have an incentive to monitor their banks; (2) managers
do not fear shareholder disapproval because the regulatory scheme discourages bank takeovers de-
spite depressed share values; (3) managers can tolerate depressed share prices as long as deposits are
available; and (4) portfolio diversification theory suggests that diversified shareholders may welcome
additional risk-taking by bank management if it promises high returns. Helen A. Garten, What
P ice Bank Failure?, 50 Onio ST. L.J. 1159-62, 1176-80 (1989). For a discussion of other evidence
that the current bank failure policy dulls shareholders' and creditors' incentive to reduce the threat
of bank failure, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring and
the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1153, 1167, 1184 (1988).
156. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.A.); see also Gaff, 919 F.2d at 394-96 ("The equity of the statute supports our conclusion that
the FDIC's claims against the Bank's officers and directors should receive a priority over Gaff's
claim.").
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The FDIC argued in Gaff that Congress implicitly intended the
FDIC to have priority over bank shareholders in litigation against bank-
related defendants as a power incidental to satisfying its express obliga-
tion under FIRREA to protect its deposit insurance funds.157 An analy-
sis of the legislative history of FIRREA, however, does not support the
FDIC's claim of implicit authority. Even the provision's proponents
have agreed that, unless Congress explicitly enacts the provision, no
FDIC priority exists under the current formulation of federal banking
law. Additionally, the legislative history of FIRREA indicates that Con-
gress specifically excluded it from FIRREA.
The assertion that Congress implicitly created an FDIC priority is
illogical, given Congress's subsequent efforts to enact an explicit priority
provision that has no retroactive effect. One of the priority provision's
most supportive proponents, the late Senator Heinz, admitted that the
provision, as included in recent post-FIRREA legislation, would have no
retroactive effect on the rights of shareholders who commenced causes of
action before enactment of the provision. 158 In fact, many versions of the
priority provision in recent banking reform bills contain an explicit "no
retroactivity" clause.1 59 The natural implication of a non-retroactivity
clause is that Congress does not intend to subject an individual to a law
(in this instance a law that provides FDIC priority over shareholders that
did not exist at the time a shareholder filed suit) that did not exist at the
time the individual chose to file suit. If Congress had intended to create
implicitly an FDIC priority in FIRREA, it would not have employed a
"no retroactivity" clause.
Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit in FDIC v. Jenkins pointed
out, 16° Congress specifically rejected an amendment, Section 214(o) of
Senate Bill 774, that would have explicitly granted the FDIC a priority
over shareholders in the enactment of FIRREA:
In any proceeding related to any claim acquired under section 11 or 13
of this Act against an insured financial institution's director, officer,
157. The court stated:
The FDIC reasons that as minimizing the depletion of the insurance fund is an express
goal of the FDIC's statutory framework, the FDIC could not carry out its alleged statutory
mission unless it had the ability to assert priority over the shareholders who are seeking
recovery from the same assets as the corporation and that the need for the priority rule is
thus "implicit" in the statutory scheme of the FDIC.
Gaff, 919 F.2d at 394-95.
158. See Banking Committees Approve Budget Packages Containing BIF Premium Bills, 1990
Daily Rep. Execs. (BNA) No. 199, at A-14 (Oct. 15, 1990) ("The provision would not apply retroac-
tively to pending cases, Heinz said.").
159. See S. 3194, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 208(b) (1990) ("The amendment.., shall not apply to
suits, claims, or causes of action of depositors, creditors, or shareholders commenced before the date
of enactment of this Act.").
160. 888 F.2d 1537, 1538 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989).
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... or any other party employed by or providing services to an insured
financial institution, any... cause of action brought by the [FDIC]
shall have priority over any... cause of action asserted by depositors,
creditors, or shareholders of the insured financial institution .... This
priority shall apply to both the prosecution of any :.. cause of action,
and to the execution of any subsequent judgments resulting from such
suit.1 6 1
The U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs recommended and included an analysis of Section 214(o) in its com-
mittee report dated January 3, 1989.162 Opposition in the House of
Representatives caused the joint conference committee unequivocally
and explicitly to reject the provision. 16 3 Representatives Staggers and
Glickman, both members of the conference committee, explained in the
Congressional Record that the House Judiciary Committee conferees ar-
dently blocked section 214(o) in conference. As Representative Glick-
man stated:
The Judiciary Committee conferees, in particular, believed strongly
that these provisions were inappropriate and the conference committee
agreed to reject the Senate position, thereby deleting this provision.
Of most concern to the conferees was that portion of section 214
of S. 774 that would have added a new subsection (o) to section 11 of
the FDIC Act....
The Judiciary Committee conferees-on a bipartisan basis and
supported by Banking Committee conferees-insisted that all of pro-
posed new subsection (o), including the priority provision, be deleted
from the final legislation. The Senate conferees thereafter agreed to
recede and the provision is not included in the conference report. 164
Representative Glickman indicated that the provision had failed be-
cause Congress had not conducted a meaningful study or debate on the
matter, the provision would undermine private enforcement against bank
fraud, and it would grant the FDIC an unfair advantage over
shareholders:
The conferees rejected [the] absolute "priority" provision for a number
of reasons. This provision received no careful study by the Congress
161. S. 774, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 214(o) (1990).
162. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOusING, AND URBAN AFFAiRs, FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS REFORM, RECOVERY, AND ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989).
163. Section 214(o) is conspicuously missing from the conference report version of FIRREA,
which was read into the Congressional Record on August 1, 1989. See 135 CONG. REC. 14714,
H4734 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1989) (conference report on H.R. 1278). Two days later, conferees ex-
plained that the provision had been rejected in conference. See infra text accompanying notes 164-
67.
164. 135 CONG. REC. 114985 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
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... [A]s the Judiciary conferees pointed out at some length, giving
the FDIC an absolute priority would undermine fraud enforcement,
would be potentially unfair to private plaintiffs who were innocent vic-
tims of wrongdoing, and would be at cross purposes with the thrust of
the savings and loan legislation.
If the FDIC was granted an absolute priority, private parties
would have little chance of recovery and as a result would no longer
bring fraud suits against bank officers and others guilty of wrongdoing.
As several of the conferees noted, the ... [SEC], in a [sic] amicus brief
filed in a pending case in the eleventh circuit on this matter, has argued
persuasively that granting such a priority would therefore have a seri-
ous adverse impact on enforcement efforts. Private actions, the SEC
stated, are a necessary supplement to the enforcement efforts of the
SEC and the Department of Justice, which do not have the resources
to enforce the law on their own.
The debate in the conference made clear that there were other
policy reasons as well to drop the Senate priority provision. A number
of Judiciary Committee conferees stated that the provision was unfair
in allowing the FDIC to intervene at any stage in a case and stay the
proceedings, even if a private party had been litigating a claim for
years. Other conferees insisted that there was no evidence that a prior-
ity would benefit the American taxpayers in any meaningful way, espe-
cially in view of the likelihood of increased fraud. Finally, concern
was expressed that enactment of a priority would be a disincentive to
investment in savings institutions, since an investor would have no re-
course if his investment was procured through fraud. 165
Later that day, Representative Harley 0. Staggers, Jr. added:
I want to take a moment to make certain that the record is absolutely
clear with respect to certain provisions that were in the Senate version
of the savings and loan legislation ....
The House Judiciary conferees were concerned about this provi-
sion for a number of policy and procedural reasons .... [T]here had
been no careful study of the priority proposal by Congress. The propo-
sal was not in the draft savings and loan legislation sent to Congress by
the administration. No hearings were held on the matter in either the
House or the Senate. The provision was not in the House bill, nor in
the Senate bill as introduced. Although the language was added by
Senator HEINZ at the request of the FDIC during committee consider-
ation, there was virtually no discussion about a priority in committee
and no debate on the Senate floor.
... The Judiciary Committee conferees-on a bipartisan basis-
strenuously argued against the provision as inappropriate .... After
the House conferees voted overwhelmingly to insist that the priority
165. 135 CONG. REc. H4989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
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provision not be included in the conference report, the Senate agreed
to recede and the provision was deleted.166
Six months later, in response to the FDIC's argument in Jenkins, Repre-
sentative Staggers charged in a letter to the FDIC that it seriously mis-
represented congressional intent and that the FDIC's argument
amounted to an attempt to rewrite FIRREA's legislative history:
As House conferees last year for the Judiciary and Banking Commit-
tees on the Savings & Loan bill, we are deeply concerned about a re-
cent filing by the FDIC in the Unites States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in the case of FDIC v. Jenkins (No. 88-3798).
As you may know, the issue in the Jenkins case is whether the
FDIC is entitled to an absolute priority over bank shareholders in
claims against officers, directors, and other third parties who may have
been responsible for the failure of a financial institution. On November
27, 1989, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit held, correctly in our view,
that the FDIC was not entitled to such an absolute priority, citing the
legislative history of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989....
... Last summer the FDIC suggested that legislative language be
included in FIRREA to change the law on priority to conform to its
legal arguments in the Jenkins case. This language was overwhelm-
ingly and specifically rejected by the conference and, thereafter, by
Congress.
.... [The conferees' vote] was clearly a direct and substantive
congressional decision that the FDIC should not have an absolute pri-
ority in these cases. 167
The foregoing testimony is the only public mention of the short-
lived § 214(o), and it does not indicate a broad congressional intention to
accord the FDIC any priority over individual shareholders. The legisla-
tive history leaves no doubt, in fact, that Congress wholeheartedly disfa-
vored enactment of an FDIC priority provision in FIRREA, and
therefore that the enacted version of FIRREA contains no implicit au-
thority for such an FDIC priority.
Notwithstanding this explicit rejection of FDIC priority, the Sixth
Circuit in Gaff ignorantly disregarded Congress's clear intent by provid-
ing the FDIC such a priority in an indefensibly ill-researched opinion:
It is unclear what happened to this provision as the FIRREA Act
worked its way hastily through Congress.... [T]he legislative history
says nothing about why the Senate did not include this proposal. We
believe the best explanation is that Congress thought it best that the
166. 135 CONG. REc. H4989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Staggers).
167. Letter from Rep. Harley 0. Staggers, Jr. to L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC (Jan. 30,
1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REc. E547, ES47-48 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1990).
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law of priorities in bank receiverships should be developed by the fed-
eral courts on a case-by-case basis. 168
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's supposition, Congress had made com-
pletely clear "what happened to this provision": Congress rejected it.
Therefore, the legislative history of FIRREA does not support the
FDIC's contention that the FIRREA implies an FDIC priority.
V. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Congress has considered a provision for FDIC priority over share-
holders in suing and collecting damages against bank-related defendants
in several recent legislative initiatives, including the most recent Senate
banking reform bill.' 69 While establishing an FDIC priority over share-
holders in prosecuting claims and executing judgments against deposi-
tory institution officers and directors, the Senate bill proscribes
168. Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 395-96 (6th Cir. 1990).
169. The version of the priority provision that Congress considered most recently is:
SEC. 230. PRIORITY OF CERTAIN CLAIMS
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 11 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1821)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(s) PRIORITY OF CERTAIN CLAIMS.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-Subject to paragraph (2), in any proceeding brought by the
Corporation, any claim acquired under this section or section 12 or 13 against an insured
depository institution's director, officer, employee, agent, attorney, accountant, appraiser,
or any other person employed by or providing services to an insured depository institution
shall have priority over any claim against that person by a depositor, creditor, or share-
holder of the insured depository institution other than a claim by another Federal agency
or the United States.
"(2) NOTIFICATION.-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-If the Corporation receives written notice that a depositor,
creditor, or shareholder of an insured depository institution has asserted a claim in a pro-
ceeding described in paragraph (1), a claim of the Corporation shall not have priority
under paragraph (1) unless the Corporation-
"(i) not later than 180 days after receiving the notice (or if the Corporation
acquires its claim after receipt of the notice, not later than 180 days after acquiring the
claim)-
"(I) files with the court a statement that the Corporation intends to pursue
its claim; and
"(II) diligently pursues that claim; and
"(ii) files suit not later than 1 year after receiving the notice (or, if the Corpo-
ration acquires its claim after receiving the notice, not later than 1 year after acquiring the
claim), unless the court extends that period in accordance with subparagraph (B).
"(B) REQUESTS FOR EXTENSIONS.-
"(i) IN GENERAL.-At the Corporation's request, the court shall extend the
period for the Corporation to file suit, unless the court finds that granting the extension
would result in prejudice to a person's ability to prove the person's claim that would out-
weigh any harm to the Government resulting from denial of the extension.
"(ii) CONSIDERATION OF CORPORATION'S DILIGENCE.-In making a finding
under clause (i), the court shall consider the Corporation's diligence in investigating its
claim.
"(3) EFFECT OF PRIORITY.-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-The Corporation's priority shall apply to-
"(i) the prosecution of any suit, claim, or cause of action; and
"(ii) the execution of any judgment resulting from that claim.
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retroactive application of the FDIC priority and sets up an intricate noti-
fication system to minimize the risk to shareholders of preemption late in
the litigation process.
Although an FDIC priority over bank shareholders lacks endorse-
ment in the House of Representatives, the Senate adopted the priority
provision three times: in its versions of FIRREA in 1989; 170 in the Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990;171 and in Title XXV of the
1990 omnibus crime bill-the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud
Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990.172
More recently, Senator John Heinz included the provision in the
Reduction of Cost of Savings and Loan Crisis Act on January 30, 1991,
shortly before his death. 173 Senator Garn also reintroduced the provision
"(B) LIMITArN.-Paragraph (1) does not give the Corporation priority as to
an asset adjudicated to be unavailable to satisfy any judgment resulting from the Corpora-
tion's claim.".
(b) APPLICABILITY-The amendment made by subsection (a) shall not apply to any
claim of a depositor, creditor, or shareholder commenced before the date of enactment of
this Act.
S. 543, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 230 (1991).
170. S. 774, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 214(o) (1989). Congress took the priority provision out of
FIRREA because of strong objection by the House during conference. See supra text accompanying
notes 163-67.
171. S. 3209, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2006 (1990). House objection remained strong the second
time the Senate proposed an FDIC priority, in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.
Congress never enacted the Senate version of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.
Rather, the House version, H.R. 5835, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), which did not contain an FDIC
priority provision, became the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
172. S. 3194, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 208 (1990). In the period before the enactment of the crime
bill, the priority provision surfaced in various independent depository institution reform bills
designed to enhance FIRREA. See Financial Crimes Prosecution and Recovery Act, S. 2735, H.R.
5050, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 305 (1990), 136 CONG. RIc. S8031, H3676 (daily ed. June 14, 1990)
(introduced as companion bills by Senator Kassebaum and Representative Wylie); Savings and Loan
Fraud Money Recovery Act of 1990, H.R. 5410, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1990), 136 CONG. REC.
H5882, H5883 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (introduced by Representative Oakar); Federal Deposit
Improvements Act of 1990, S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1004 (1990), 136 CONG. REc. S9217,
S9217 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (introduced by Senator Garn); Savings and Loan Prosecution Facili-
tation Act, H.R. 5150, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1990), 136 CONG. REc. H4201, H4201 (daily ed.
June 26, 1990) (placed by House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel). The Senate included the
FDIC priority of claims provision, among other provisions from these banking reform bills, in the
large savings and loan amendment to Senator Biden's version of the crime bill in July 1990. See
Amendment No. 2116, § 259, 136 CONG. REC. S9580, S9585 (daily ed. July 11, 1990).
The House version of the crime bill, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990, H.R. 5269,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), did not contain the priority provision. After the House of Representa-
tives passed H.R. 5269, the Senate struck all after the enacting clause and essentially re-passed Sena-
tor Biden's bill, S. 1970, which did contain the priority provision. 136 CONG. REc. S16479 (daily ed.
Oct. 22, 1990). At conference, just as in FIRREA, the conferees dropped the priority provision and
ultimately created a new bill, S. 3266, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 136 CONG. REc. S17861, H13288
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). This new bill became the Crime Control Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-
647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4859 (1990).
173. S. 293, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1991), 137 CONG. REc. S1293 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1991).
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in the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvements Act of 1991 on March
13, 1991.174 And finally, the provision is currently under consideration
in the Senate as part of the Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform
and Taxpayer Protection Act.175
As recently as last year, the FDIC itself was skeptical that Congress
would ever enact an FDIC priority of claims provision 176 because of op-
position by the House Judiciary Committee. 177 The increasing cost of
unsatisfied claims to the federal deposit insurance system, 178 however,
may weaken the opposition to the provision in upcoming banking reform
legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
A federal common law rule of FDIC priority of claims would in-
struct a court to stay all shareholder actions against officers and directors
concurrently being pursued by the FDIC. This Note has considered the
merits of expanding federal common law to aid the FDIC during Con-
gress's deadlock on the issue, and concludes that the Supreme Court's
guidelines for federal common law development, expressed in Kimbell
Foods, cannot support such an expansion. A rule of priority for the
FDIC over shareholders fails every element of the Kimbell Foods test:
The nature of the FDIC's operations do not require a uniform rule; state
laws on the priority of claims do not frustrate the federal deposit insur-
ance system; and a rule of priority would disrupt established commercial
relationships. The Note also demonstrates that, contrary to the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Gaff v. FDIC, an FDIC priority over depository in-
stitution shareholders is not implied in FIRREA.
The Sixth Circuit's use of federal common law to establish FDIC
priority over depository institution shareholders has diverted attention
174. S. 651, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 105 (1991), 137 CONG. REc. S3191 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
175. S. 543, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 230 (1991).
176. FDIC general counsel Alfred J.T. Byrne was "less [than] optimistic" that Congress would
enact the priority provision in the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer
Act of 1990. See FDIC's Byrne Predicts Safe Passage of Key Provisions in Anti-Fraud Bills, 55 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 490 (Sept. 24, 1990).
177. According to one report, House Judiciary Committee opposition to the provision was a
prominent reason for the House conferees' rejection of the Heinz provision in H.R. 5835. House
conferees also cited the damaging effect of the provision on private lawsuits that deter improper
activity. See Conferees Agree to BIF Premium Provisions Under Reconciliation Bill, 55 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 17, at 689 (Oct. 29, 1990).
178. See Letter from Robert D. Reischauer, Congressional Budget Office, to Hon. Donald W.
Riegle, Jr., Chairman of the House Banking Comm. (Oct. 14, 1990) (attaching Congressional Budget
Office Cost Estimate stating that the priority provision will both reduce litigation costs and increase
settlement recoveries, saving an estimated $10 million in 1993, $30 million in 1994, and $55 million
in 1995).
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from the real issue that Congress should consider in any future deposi-
tory institution regulatory reform: the policy implications of such a pri-
ority. A banking policy analysis of whether Congress should provide an
FDIC priority is beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, in order to
promote an informed debate of the issue, the Note has examined the Sen-
ate's recent attempts to enact a provision for such a priority. The goal of
this Note is not to discredit congressional expansion of FDIC protec-
tions. Rather, the conclusions of the foregoing analysis merely argue for
expansion in the appropriate form-legislation.
The evolution of the cost test line of cases discussed in Part III,
according the FDIC various priorities over borrowers, depicts the danger
of a cancer-like growth of FDIC priorities founded on federal common
law policies of protecting the banking system. The FDIC's special rights
and immunities under this precedent now preclude virtually any dispute
between failed financial institutions' borrowers and the FDIC. As more
financial institutions fail, pressure for new FDIC priorities is likely to
develop even more rapidly than in the past. Federal courts should not
encourage this trend by creating a federal common law rule of FDIC
priority over shareholders. Such an unwarranted disruption of estab-
lished commercial practices in the area of shareholder litigation defies the
Supreme Court's policy regarding the expansion of federal common law,
as set forth in Kimbell Foods. By rejecting a federal common law rule of
FDIC priority of claims over shareholders, courts would be sending the
issue back to Congress, where it belongs.
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